The value of competitive contracting by Healy, Pamela A. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2014-09
The value of competitive contracting
Healy, Pamela A.











JOINT APPLIED PROJECT 
 
 




By:  Pamela A. Healy,  




Advisors: Elliott Yoder 






Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for 
reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis 
Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2014 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Joint Applied Project 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
THE VALUE OF COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Pamela A. Healy, Sang Won Sok, Alejandro Ramirez 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  




 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT  
In the environment of shrinking budgets, there is a trend toward competitive contracting. Research indicates that 
the government can achieve significant cost savings from competition among industry. This paper will determine 
how much cost savings could be achieved. It will also analyze numerous contract-related Government 
Accountability Office reports and provide a summary of the Better Buying Power initiatives. This paper will also 
identify circumstances that prohibit full and open competition and patterns where competition is most successful. 
Finally, this paper will provide recommendations to assist federal executives in maximizing competitive 








14. SUBJECT TERMS Open competition, contract cost savings, better buying power, total 
ownership cost savings 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
75 





18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 










NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
  ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  iii 
 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE VALUE OF COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING 
 
 
Pamela A. Healy, Civilian, Department of the Army 
Sang Won Sok, Civilian, Department of the Army 
Alejandro Ramirez, Civilian, Department of the Navy 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 












Authors:  Pamela A. Healy 
 







Approved by: Elliott Yoder 
 
Richard M. Nalwasky, Commander, SC, USN 2 




   William R. Gates, Dean 
       Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
  iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  v 






In the environment of shrinking budgets, there is a trend toward competitive 
contracting. Research indicates that the government can achieve significant cost savings 
from competition among industry. This paper will determine how much cost savings 
could be achieved. It will also analyze numerous contract-related Government 
Accountability Office reports and provide a summary of the Better Buying Power 
initiatives. This paper will also identify circumstances that prohibit full and open 
competition and patterns where competition is most successful. Finally, this paper will 
provide recommendations to assist federal executives in maximizing competitive 
contracting and provide the knowledge needed help achieve mandates for improved 
efficiency and reduced costs. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The process of federal contracting officially began in 1795 when the Purveyor of Public 
Affairs Act authorized the federal government to purchase goods from private vendors. In 
1861, advertised procurements were mandated for the first time by the Civil Sundry 
Appropriations Act. The Armed Services Procurement Act enacted in 1947, outlined 
procurement procedures for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for all goods and 
services. The law required sealed bidding for government contracts and required the 
government to make awards to the lowest bidder that could fulfill the government’s need 
(Perlman, 2007). For over 200 years, the federal government has met its need for goods 
and services by encouraging competition and increasing efficiency with the ultimate goal 
of maximizing the use of taxpayer dollars. Today, numerous laws and regulations require 
the federal government to award contracts based on full and open competition. This paper 
will determine the actual cost saving achieved from competition by analyzing and 
summarizing the data of over 50 competitive contract actions. It will also determine 
circumstances that prohibit full and open competition. The paper will identify patterns 
where competition is most successful and provide recommendations to help federal 
leaders garner successful savings through competitive contracting. 
As the United States deficit continues to grow and the DOD budgets continue to 
shrink the most recent initiative titled the Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0 aims “to 
achieve greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending” federal agencies are 
being required to reduce costs by improving efficiencies (Kendall, 2012).  Specifically, 
BBP 2.0 focuses on the following seven focus areas: incentivize productivity and 
innovation in industry and government, eliminate unproductive processes and 
bureaucracy, promote effective competition, improve tradecraft in acquisition of services, 
and improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce. Although all seven 
focus areas are equally important, this thesis paper will focus on promoting effective 
competition through multi bid competitive contracting (Kendall, 2012).  
This paper summarizes numerous reports on competitive contracting that have 
been released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO reports 
  xvi 
analyzed for this paper provided historical data and analyzed trends in federal 
contracting. GAO 10-833 reported that non-competed actions decreased by 16 percent 
from 2005 to 2009; however, contracts competed with one offer increased by six percent. 
During the same timeframe, overall competitive contracting increased (Hutton, 2010).  
Often organizations are hesitant to initiate a full and open competition for fear 
that they will get an inexperienced vendor, unreliable product, or encounter a lengthy 
contract lead time that could negatively impact their schedule. Selecting the right 
evaluation strategy for each contracting action can help ensure that organizations receive 
the best quality of services to meet their needs while achieving a cost savings through 
competition. The contract lead time for full and open competition and best value awards 
is usually longer than for sole source and/or lowest price awards. Whenever possible, 
organizations should take advantage of existing contract vehicles to reduce contract lead 
time while allowing for best value awards (U.S. General Services Administration, 2009).  
The General Services Administration (GSA) offers several options for 
organizations to shorten contract lead times by leveraging already awarded government 
wide acquisition contracts (GWAC). GWAC contract vehicles are indefinite delivery, 
indefinite quantity contracts that establish a maximum cost for a product or service and 
have been awarded via full and open competition to highly qualified vendors (U.S. 
General Services Administration, 2009). 
The GAO reports proved that the competition rate is fluid when broken into 
categories such as products, research and development services, and non-research and 
development services. The probability of competition increasing or decreasing is not 
consistent across the different categories. The reports revealed that although the overall 
contracting dollars has decreased from 2010 to 2012, the percentage for fair opportunity 
given had a steady increase. In 2010, the fair opportunity was 85 percent; in 2011 it 
increased to 88 percent (Department of Defense, 2012). This trend reflects the positive 
impact that the BBP initiative is having on competitive contracting.   
It was determined that organizations average a 20 percent cost savings on 
competed contracts. Researchers analyzed 56 contracts for agencies throughout the 
  xvii 
government. 80 percent of the samples were from DOD sources and 20 percent were 
from non-DOD services. Overall, commodities seemed to yield a higher cost savings than 
services; however, the average remained at 20 percent. In an environment of shrinking 
budgets and increased mandates, such as BBP, it is in the best interest of organizations to 
do their best to achieve efficiencies. Competitive contracting is a proven solution to 
helping achieve sustainable cost savings. 
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A. BACKGROUND  
Although the Department of Defense (DOD) has recently placed a significant 
amount of emphasis on the need to reduce the total ownership cost of systems being 
deployed on the battlefield, this is not a new concept. In 1979, the Report to the Congress 
by the Comptroller General of the United States submitted a comprehensive report that 
examined the Claims Processing System utilized by Medicare. The objective of the report 
was to showcase that more could be done to achieve greater efficiency in contracting for 
the Medicare Claims Processing process. Although the Report to the Congress by the 
Comptroller General is not directly related to the Government Accountability Office 
reports on DOD related contracting actions, there is a strong parallel between the 
affordability issues in 1979 and the affordability issues Dr. Carter outlined in his Better 
Buying Power Memorandum issued in 2010. 
In 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, Mr. Ashton B. Carter issued a memorandum for acquisition professionals. The 
subject of the memorandum was Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring 
Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending. This begs the question; what has the 
United States government and the DOD been doing for the past 31 years that nothing 
appears to have improved in the way the government issues and administers contracts. 
In 1979 the federal defense budget was $143.7 billion compared to the federal 
defense budget in 2010, which was $847.08 billion when Mr. Carter issued the Better 
Buying Power memorandum (Carter, 2010). Figure 1 captures the United States Defense 
budget from 1979 through the estimated defense budget in FY 2018. The figures show a 
steady increase in defense spending during the 1980s. This can be attributed to the 
increased defense spending during President Ronald Reagan’s presidency. President 
Reagan was a strong supporter of the military and ensuring the United States was 
postured to defeat any threat that might challenge the American way of life. Figure 2 
helps develop the perspective of how much the defense budget has increased over the 
 2 
years. Figure 2 utilizes 2009 dollars to achieve a better comparison of the defense budget 
when inflation is taken into account.  
The second major spike in defense spending begins in 2001. The defense budget 
increases significantly at a very steep expenditure rate. That is attributed to the terrorist 
attacks against the United States. The attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York 
City increased the defense spending to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The data 
in red is the estimated trend for defense spending (Figure 1). The data indicates that 
defense spending is going to be reduced in future fiscal years. This can be attributed to 
the conclusion of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, sequestration, and adhering to Mr. Frank 
Kendall’s Better Buying Power 2.0 directive, which was released in 2013. 
 
Figure 1.  U.S. defense spending (from DOD, 2014) 
The background on the defense spending creates a natural catalyst to the purpose 
we are creating this thesis. It is obvious by looking at Figure 2 that our defense spending  
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is out of control. The September 11, 2001 events are a significant contributor to what we 
are seeing in the data. None the less, we must continue to be good stewards of the 
American people’s money. 
 
 
Figure 2.  U.S. defense spending (from DOD, 2014) 
B. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this study is to validate the cost savings that can be achieved by 
increasing the number of vendors that respond to contract solicitations. As defense 
acquisition employees, studies show that there are cost savings (estimated at 20 percent) 
that can be achieved by increasing competition. The purpose of this thesis is to validate 
the studies and determine the actual cost savings that can be achieved by vendor 
competition. The intent is to evaluate the data that is collected, filter out elements that 
cannot be compared across vendors, and focus on the data that can be compared 
unilaterally across all the vendors placing a bid on the solicitation. 
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The DOD and the United States government is feeling the economic recession and 
requires measures to be implemented to assure affordability of the weapon systems, 
equipment, facilities, and support services. The restraints on the federal budget have led 
us to ask some very significant questions. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To assist the federal acquisition workforce in achieving their mission while 
progressing through the acquisition lifecycle, this thesis will address the following 
questions. 
1. Primary Research Question 
Do competitive contracts achieve a 20 percent cost savings to the government and 
ultimately the taxpayers? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What prohibits the government from divesting from sole source 
contracting and awarding all contracts as full and open competition 
contracts? 
b. What information can we glean from the data to identify patterns where 
competition is most successful? 
c. What recommendations would help commands garner successful savings? 
D. SCOPE/METHODOLOGY  
The research will yield a comparative analysis of full and open competitive 
information technology (IT) contracts to corroborate the notion that there is a cost 
savings of approximately 20 percent when posted on Federal Business Opportunities 
(FEDBIZOPS) as a full and open competition solicitation. First, the team will collect and 
analyze data from an Army acquisition program as well as the General Services 
Administration (GSA). An analysis will be conducted to determine the average percent of 
cost saving that was achieved for each award. The contract samples will consist of 
commodities and services procured by IT programs. The sample size will not be limited 
to a certain business type. The sample data may contain a variety of business types  
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including large and small businesses, woman owned small, small disadvantage, section 
8(a), etc.). The data may consist of multiple agencies across the DOD as well as non-
DOD federal agencies.  
Second, the team will analyze the quotes from multiple vendors of competitive 
contracting actions and determine the percentage of cost savings that is achieved from the 
highest bidder to the actual award value. If needed, weighted factors will be identified 
and then calculated through a percentage formula. The team will analyze the data to 
determine if competitive contracting results in a cost savings to the government by 
comparing the actual cost against the estimated costs.  
Finally, the team will review various Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
reports and federal mandates and initiatives on contracting and cost savings. The purpose 
will be to consolidate the data from the GAO reports coupled with the authors’ personal 
experiences to make recommendations for organizations working to achieve the greatest 
cost savings. The mandates will be reviewed to determine what restrictions and rules 
have been implemented related to contracts, cost savings, and competition.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
Chapter I of this research paper provides background to the problem and will 
define the research objectives and the methodology in which the research was conducted. 
Chapter II will identify data, literature, and reports used during this analysis. Chapter III 
will present the data and methodology used in the analysis. Chapter IV will discuss the 
discoveries of the analysis and provide recommendations for government officials to 
maximize cost savings. 
This report provides a comprehensive summary to identify the goals of this thesis 
paper. Providing best value is critical to continue to afford the products and services 
purchased by the federal government and more specific the DOD. 
F. SUMMARY  
The federal government has a long history of relying on contracts to achieve 
goals. Acquisition programs are especially reliant on contracts to meet milestones and 
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accomplish their mission. Contracts are a significant element of schedules and the total 
cost of acquisition programs. Competitive contracting has been regulated, tracked and 
encouraged for over 35 years; however, the government is still utilizing non-competitive 
contracts. In March 1996, the DOD reported to Congress that competitive contracting had 
resulted in an annual savings of $1.5 billion. Despite the cost savings from competitive 
contracting, recent GAO reports indicate that non-competitive contracting is on the rise 
within the DOD, which would contradict with the Better Buying Power (BBP).  
Competitive contracting is designed to provide the federal government with the 
best value for products and services. Non-competitive contracting occurs when the 
government specifies the vendor to provide the goods and services. This is referred to as 
a non-competitive contract action or a sole source. One could argue that a sole source 
vendor has little incentive to offer the government a low price since the vendor is 
guaranteed to receive the award. One could also argue that the institutional knowledge 
held by the incumbent vendor is valuable and should be weighed.  
This report will review competitive contract actions and determine the estimated 
savings obtained by the DOD. The report will also determine factors that prohibit the 
government from divesting from sole source contracting and awarding all contracts as 
full and open competition contracts. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I provided a background for this research by explaining the Better Buying 
Power initiative by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, Mr. Ashton B. Carter, and how it is linked to the thesis statement. This chapter 
will focus on the literature and concepts surrounding our data in support of our analysis. 
First, we will take a closer look at the Better Buying Power Memorandums and how they 
provide the framework in supporting full and open competition. The federal contract 
evaluation criteria will be discussed, particularly the best value and lowest price 
technically acceptable (LPTA). We will also review and explain the services offered by 
the GSA and determine if GSA provides benefits to helping meet the mandates. Finally, 
we will conclude with recommendations for government officials. 
B. MEMORANDUMS ON THE BETTER BUYING POWER INITIATIVE 
Dr. Ashton Carter was a visionary in terms of defense acquisition. He realized 
that defense spending was out of control and that measures had to be implemented to 
slow down defense spending by establishing a process to make our systems affordable 
yet reliable, available, and maintainable by our forces on the battlefield. He developed the 
Better Buying Power strategy to control defense spending by reducing total ownership 
cost. 
1. Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and 
Productivity in Defense Spending: 28 JUNE 2010  
This memorandum was the introduction of the Better Buying Power initiative to 
the acquisition workforce and the foundation for the subsequent guidance memorandums 
(Carter, 2010). The Dr. Ashton Carter projected beyond being a nation at war with a 
defense budget not expecting to decline at the time, but to adopt efficient practices in 
managing the defense dollars. The focus of the memorandum: “delivering better value to 
the taxpayer and improving the way the Department does business” (Carter, 2010).  
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The Defense Department’s spending at the time was approximately $700 billion 
per year (Carter, 2010). Approximately $300 billion of the defense budget was on 
supporting everyday operations from salaries and benefits to military and civilian 
personnel to buildings and facilities (Carter, 2010). The remaining $400 billion was 
divided fairly equally between products (such as weapons, electronics, etc.) and services 
(such as information technology (IT) services, knowledge-based services, etc.) (Carter, 
2010). The $400 billion is what the BBP initiative focused on and sought to make that 
$400 billion “stretch” as much as possible by gaining efficiencies (Carter, 2010). 
The memorandum discusses two main ways of addressing the initiative:  
a. To reduce the funding to unneeded or low-priority overhead (such as 
unneeded programs and activities). Shift the funding to force structure and 
modernization to allow the warfighting capabilities grow at approximately 
three percent annually. Historically, the annual three percent rate of 
growth is needed to provide the warfighters what they need. 
b. In the programs and activities we need cost saving can be gained by 
becoming more efficient in the manner in which we conduct business. 
Essentially, the mantra of this initiative is to do more without more.  
2. Guidance For Achieving Greater Efficiency On Procurements and 
Services  
This memorandum was a direct follow-up to provide specific guidance to achieve 
the June 28, 2010 mandate. This guidance contained 23 principal actions to improve 
efficiency divided into five major areas.  
a. Target affordability and control cost growth 
b. Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry 
c. Promote real competition 
d. Improve tradecraft in services acquisition 
e. Reduce non-productive processes and bureaucracy 
There are three principal actions under the third guidance Promote Real 
Competition:  
a. Present a competitive strategy at each program Milestone. This principal 
describes how each program must provide a competitive strategy even if it 




competition in an unproductive sole source situation or to adapt 
commercial products, the directive is to have some sort of competition 
strategy engrained by each Milestone.  
b. Remove obstacles to competition. The memorandum states that DOD has 
achieved the highest rate of competition in the recent years in its history; 
however, a significant portion of it was considered to be “ineffective 
competition.” This means that a solicitation was publicized under full and 
open competition; however, only one bidder was received. Since each 
service component and agency has a competition advocate, it directed that 
each advocate create a plan to improve on two areas; 1) the overall rate of 
competition 2) the rate of effective competition. The expectation that the 
competition improvement rate should be at least two percent per year and 
the effective competition improvement rate should be at least 10 percent 
per year. The directive of improving the overall rate of competition is 
meant for each Service to increase the number of competitive contracts 
overall by two percent. However the effective competition improvement 
rate, which is just as important, refers to reducing the number of 
competitive contracts that only have one bidder and by increasing by 10 
percent per year in having “real competitive contracts” by having more 
bidders from industry bid. 
c. Increase dynamic small business role in defense marketplace competition. 
Since small businesses hire over 65 percent of all new jobs and hold more 
patents than all of the nation’s universities and large corporations 
combined, the importance of small businesses is definitely recognized. 
Therefore, this directive emphasized small business utilization by 
weighting factors in past performance and in fee construct. 
3. Pessure To Obtain Greater Efficiency In Defense Spending 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Mr. 
Frank Kendall, issued the Better Buying Power 2.0 Memorandum. The Better Buying 
Power 2.0 provides a status of the progress accomplished since Dr. Ashton Carter, 
former, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued 
guidance to the acquisition community. Mr. Kendall indicates that the acquisition 
community is making significant progress on the initiatives to increase efficiencies in 
order to “do more without more.” He states that the acquisition community has learned 
from experience but still has significant work to do to accomplish greater efficiencies and 
productivity in defense spending. 
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The Better Buying Power encompasses 36 initiatives that are divided into seven 
focus areas. The focus of Better Buying Power 2.0 remains the same as the original Better 
Buying Power. The focus continued on the ability of the defense acquisition workforce to 
deliver better value to the American taxpayer and to provide the most advanced 
capabilities to the warfighter by improving the acquisition process utilized by the defense 
acquisition workforce.  
The Better Buying Power 2.0 focuses on the following seven focus areas: 
incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and government, eliminate 
unproductive processes and bureaucracy, promote effective competition, improve 
tradecraft in acquisition of services, and improve the professionalism of the total 
acquisition workforce. Although all seven focus areas are equally important, for the 
purpose of this thesis paper, we will focus on promoting effective competition through 
multi bid competitive contracting. 
4. Better Buying Power Implementation Strategy to Achieve Greater 
Efficiency in Defense  
This memorandum is follow-on from the November 13, 2012 memorandum by 
Mr. Frank Kendall. This memorandum, as the title suggests, is the implementation 
directive for each of the major areas from the previous Better Buying Power 2.0 
memorandum. The section titled promoting effective competition was divided into four 
specific sub-focus areas with both a general guidance and specific actions. The following 
are the four sub-focus areas with highlights on the specific actions: 
a. Emphasizing competition strategies and creating and maintaining 
competitive environments—Required the Component Acquisition 
Executives (CAE) to ensure that competition is considered, both directly 
and indirectly, when the acquisition strategy are being developed and in 
each acquisition decisions. 
b. Enforce open system architectures (OSA) and effectively manage 
technical data rights—Directed that OSA and technical data rights 
guidance be updated in several publications (e.g., DFARS, OSA Contract 
Guidebook for PMs version 1.1, etc.) and training material in Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU). 
c. Increase small business roles and opportunities—Directed the Director of 
the Small Business Program to participate and review updated training 
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with the partnership of DAU, acquisition strategies and technology 
development strategies, identify deficiencies, and develop comprehensive 
procurement forecasts. Additionally, the CAEs are required by Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Reauthorization Act of 2011will 
apply incentives for contracts over $100 million. 
d. Use the Technology Development (TD) phase for true risk reduction—
ASD(R&E) will provide draft guidance for technology readiness 
assessments and pre-milestone engineering and integration risk reviews. 
Also with the partnership with ASD(A), they will codify in the DAG best 
practices for TD phase risk reduction. 
5. Better Buying Power Four Years on: Is it Making a Difference? 
The Better Buying Power initiatives that Dr. Ashton Carter and Mr. Frank Kendall 
initiated have been in existence for four years. The most anticipated question regarding 
the Better Buying Power is whether the initiative is actually making a difference. Mr. 
Kendall answers that question with a “qualified yes.” Mr. Kendall utilizes Marine One 
helicopter as an example of the benefits of Better Buying Power (Kendall, 2014). When 
President Barrack Obama was elected, one of his first initiatives was to cancel the Marine 
One replacement helicopter. President Obama stated that the cost of Marine One was too 
expensive and the cost outweighed the need to replace the Marine One Helicopter 
(Kendall, 2014). 
President Barrack Obama is on his second presidential tour and the need to 
replace the Marine One helicopter has resurfaced. The lessons learned from the Better 
Buying Power initiatives are being used to achieve affordability. The measures being 
utilized to achieve affordability are: Establishing Affordability Caps for Investment and 
Sustainment, Controlling Life Cycle Cost, Incentivizing Productivity, Streamlining 
Management and Processes, Promoting Competition, and Improving Professionalism 
(Kendall, 2014).  
As mentioned earlier, the focus of this paper is promoting competition. The 
Marine One acquisition team issued a competitive solicitation. Ironically, there was only 
one bidder on the solicitation. Although only one solicitation was received, the 
acquisition team created an environment for competition thus creating an environment 
that cast pressure on the sole bidder to submit a competitive bid. If the contract would 
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have been solicited as a sole source contract, the contractor would have no incentive to 
reduce his or her cost proposal. The threat of competition renders a cost saving even 
when only on bid is received. (Kendall, 2014) 
C. FEDERAL CONTRACT EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Per the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), proposal evaluation is the 
assessment of a proposal to determine the offeror’s ability to successfully perform the 
prospective contract (“Proposal Evaluation,” n.d).  It is also used to determine a fair and 
reasonable price for the contract requirement. The evaluation criteria must be specified in 
the request for proposal (RFP). This project will review best value and lowest price 
technically acceptable (LPTA) and explain instances where awarding to the lowest price 
vendor is not always in the best interest of the DOD (“Proposal Evaluation,” n.d). 
1. Best Value  
This project will use the DAU explanation for best value. Best value refers to 
competitive, negotiated procurements in which the government reserves the right to select 
the most advantageous offer to the government by evaluating and comparing factors in 
addition to cost or price. Best value procurement enables the government to purchase 
technical superiority even if it means paying a premium price. A “premium” is the 
difference between the price of the lowest priced proposal and the one which the 
government believes offers the best value.  
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), as amended, provides the 
statutory basis for conducting best value procurements. In order to successfully award a 
contract using best value evaluation criteria, organizations must ensure the solicitation 
contains clear and unambiguous descriptions of each significant factor and its relative 
importance. 
2. Lowest Price Technically Acceptable  
When the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) is the selected evaluation 
criteria, award will be made to the offeror whose price is lowest among all proposals that 
were deemed to be technically acceptable. With IT equipment, the procuring organization 
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outlines the technical specifications for the equipment. Once proposals are received from 
vendors, the procuring organization must determine if the item quoted by the vendor 
meets each of the technical specifications. This can be a lengthy process and it may 
require the vendor to provide a sample of the items for testing. DAU did a nice job at 
explaining the criteria surrounding LPTA. Specifically, DAU explained:  
a. LPTA does not permit trade-offs between price/cost and technical factors.  
b. Determining best value using the LPTA method is appropriate when the 
requirement is not complex and the technical and performance risks are 
minimal. LPTA is suitable for acquisitions where service, supply, or 
equipment requirements are well defined and there is little difference 
among competing products or services.  
c. The evaluation factors and significant sub-factors that establish the 
requirements of acceptability must be set forth in the solicitation. The 
solicitation must specify that award will be based on the lowest evaluated 
price of proposals meeting or exceeding the acceptability standards for 
non-cost factors (FAR 15.101-2).  
d. If factors such as labor mix and level of effort are important evaluation 
factors, the RFP must require that these areas be clearly quantified and 
addressed in the proposal.  
e. LPTA is not appropriate for cost type contracts. 
D. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA) GOVERNMENT 
WIDE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS (GWAC) DESCRIPTION 
Individuals who have worked for the federal government, especially an 
acquisition program, have relied on contracts to meet their mission. The contracting 
process can be lengthy, challenging and fraught with obstacles. As previously stated, 
numerous regulations require competitive contracting. Ultimately, competitive 
contracting is designed to help achieve the greatest value for the taxpayers’ dollars. Due 
to the lengthy contracting process, organizations are challenged with balancing their 
schedule, requirements, and need.  
The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 established the 
GSA. Among others, the act also specifically required that purchase prices for 
architectural and engineering services be negotiated with the top three qualified firms. 
Today, GSA has developed contracting options. The GSA has developed contracting 
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options for federal agencies to help mitigate the contracting process. GSA offers multiple 
award schedule (MAS) contracts, including the GSA schedule contract, which is a 
government-wide acquisition contracts (GWAC). This benefits the federal government by 
streamlining and simplifying the contracting process thereby assisting acquisition 
programs in receiving essential goods and services and reducing the negative impact on 
critical acquisition schedules. (U.S. General Services Administration, 2014) 
The GSA schedule contract is an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) 
long-term contract under the MAS. The GSA schedule is also referred to as the federal 
supply schedule or GSA contract. GSA awards schedule contracts to companies that offer 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products and services. Construction services, firearms 
and ammunition are not permitted on the GSA schedule contract. GSA schedule contracts 
contain pre-negotiated prices, warranties, terms and conditions. Contractors must go 
through a lengthy proposal process to be assigned a GSA contract number.  
The government also benefits from using GSA contracts since GSA requires 
vendors to pass a thorough review of past performance, capabilities, financial stability, 
and commercial sales practices. GSA negotiates discounted rates and establishes a GSA 
schedule price list. The GSA boasts that the GSA Schedule Contract is the most widely 
used government contract vehicle. We can confirm through our personal, on-the-job 
experience that buying off the GSA schedule reduces contract lead time.  
In FY2012, federal, state, and local government spent over $37 billion through 
GSA contracts (“Government Frequently Asked,” 2014). The data cited herein 
documents the cost savings achieved from approximately 50 GSA GWAC contracts. The 
data proves the cost savings that can be achieved by utilizing competition. GSA is 
considered a viable option for agencies requiring COTS products or IT services. 
(“Government Frequently Asked,” 2014) 
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, the BBP initiatives have remained critical through several 
administrative terms spanning multiple years. The fact that BBP continues to be revisited, 
strengthened and promoted indicates that organizations will be held accountable for  
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“doing more without more.” In order to succeed in this climate, it is in the best interest of 
organizations to embrace the mandates and make real, meaningful changes that yield 
efficiencies. 
Promoting real, effective competition in contracting can help organizations 
achieve the mandated cost savings. As evidenced in the exampled provided regarding the 
Marine One helicopter, the threat of competition encourages vendors to reduce the total 
cost to the lowest possible amount. When an award is made to a sole sourced vendor, that 
vendor has little incentive to discount the price. 
Often organizations are hesitant to initiate a full and open competition for fear 
that they will get an inexperienced vendor or unreliable product. Selecting the right 
evaluation strategy for each contracting action can help ensure that organizations receive 
the best quality of services to meet their needs while achieving a cost savings through 
competition. Lowest price is often not in the government’s best interest. While it may 
ensure the government pays the least amount for a product initially, the long-term costs 
due to technological or contractor inexperience could outweigh the initial cost savings. 
Selecting a source based on best value allows the government to select the most 
advantageous offer by evaluating and comparing factors in addition to cost. Our personal 
on-the-job experience indicates that organizations tend to steer away from full and open 
competition and best value award criteria when faced with short timelines and schedule 
delays. The contract lead time for full and open competition and best value awards is 
usually longer than for sole source and/or lowest price awards. Whenever possible, 
organizations should take advantage of existing contract vehicles to reduce contract lead 
time while allowing for best value awards. 
The GSA offers several options for organizations to shorten contract lead times by 
leveraging already awarded GWAC. GWAC contract vehicles are IDIQ contracts that 
establish a maximum cost for a product or service and have been awarded via full and 




requirements, vendors compete again and typically discount their quotes to ensure they 
are lower than the previously established award amounts. GSA is a viable option for 




III. DATA PRESENTATION 
A. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORTS 
A review of several GAO reports on the subject of competition and contracting 
was performed. The following section will provide a summary of those reports.  
1. GAO-10-833 Federal Contracting—Opportunities Exist to Increase 
Competition and Assess Reasons When Only One Offer Is Received 
The 2010 GAO report provided some critical background information that has 
helped shape the current competition status in DOD. The report mentions the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) in 1984, which required all federal agencies to 
obtain goods and services via a full and open competition using competitive procedures; 
however, there were exceptions written into the CICA. There are seven circumstances in 
which agencies do not have to conduct a full and open competition as described in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Subpart 6.3.  
The executive and legislative branches have taken several steps to reinforce and 
encourage competition. The following are some executive examples:  
a. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) recognizes although full and 
open competitions are conducted there may only one offer; therefore, 
agencies are required to separately record those instances as 
“noncompetitive procurements using competitive procedures.”  
b. Additionally, in May 2007 the OFPP required that each executive agency 
have a competition advocate. The competition advocate is required to 
submit an annual report recommending goals and plans for improving 
competition to their senior procurement executive and chief acquisition 
officer. 
c. In May 2009, OMB instructed agencies to reduce the total dollars 
obligated to high-risk contracts, such noncompetitive contracts and 
competitive contracts with only one offer, by 10 percent in fiscal year 
2010. 
d. By October 2009, OFPP followed up with guidelines for agencies to 
evaluate the effectiveness of their competition practices. 
c. The following are some examples of legislative actions from 2008: 
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1. Noncompetitive awards need to be publicly posted per the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 
2. Enhanced competition for task orders on multiple award contracts 
per the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 
3. Major defense acquisition programs are required to include 
acquisition strategies with measures to ensure competition 
throughout the life cycle of the program per the Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act 
4. Justifications, approvals, and notices are required for sole source 
contracts over $20 million awarded under the authority of Small 
Business Act (SBA) 8(a) program 
With all of the above measures in place, Figure 3 indicates that the 
noncompetitive contracts decreased from 35.6 percent to 31.2 percent between the fiscal 
years of 2005 through 2009, although the noncompetitive procurement using competitive 
procedures stayed steady at 13 percent (Hutton, 2010). The total obligations reported in 
the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS-NG) during the same 
timeframe increased from $430.6 billion to $543.6 billion (Hutton, 2010).  
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Figure 3.  DOD spending 2005–2009 (from GAO, 2010) 
The 2010 GAO 10-833 report collected a sampling across all federal agencies and 
focused on 74 noncompetitive contracts and according to the exceptions referenced in the 
FAR part 6.3 (Hutton, 2010). The agencies used a variety of exceptions across the board; 
however, 42 out of the 74 as shown in Figure 4 were based on FAR 6.302-1, which refers 
to the exception of “only one responsible source” (Hutton, 2010). The second notable 
exception in Figure 4, which was composed of 20 out of the 74, was based on FAR 
6.302-5, which authorized by statute, specifically, sole source authority through the 8(a) 
program (Hutton, 2010).  
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Figure 4.  Contract FAR authority citations (from GAO, 2010) 
A few other notable reasons why some agencies inhibit competition are the 
following: 
a. Lack of access to proprietary technical data (the government did not 
procure the technical data from the original contractor) 
b. Reliance on the technical knowledge and the understanding of the 
requirements from incumbent contractors 
c. Inadequate acquisition planning (providing insufficient time for the 
contractors to properly define the requirements and adequately conduct 
market research) 
d. Overly restrictive and specific government requirements can limit the 
number of offers 
The 2010 GAO report provided examples of some agencies actively seeking to 
improve competition. A few examples were based on the Army, Navy and Coast Guard 
breaking out pieces of requirements from past sole source procurements. Only the Coast 
Guard’s example noted an approximate amount of cost savings of $13 million (Hutton, 
2010). Another great example was about the Air Force, when at the threat of competition 
was heard by the incumbent, they “sharpened their pencils,” which resulted in cost 
savings as well as improved delivery schedules. 
The GAO (2012) report had three recommendations to the OFPP as listed below:  
a. Determine whether the FAR should be amended to require agencies to 
regular review and critically evaluate when contracts are competed, but 
only receive one offer. Implement steps to increase the likelihood of 
multiple offers with the results documented in the contract file. 
b. In an effort to invigorate the competition advocate’s role, provide 
guidance to the agencies when selecting a competition advocate such as 
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the placement, types of skill sets, and the potential methods in which to 
effectively carry out the duties. 
c. Direct agencies to require their competition advocates to actively involve 
the program offices by providing insight to potential opportunities to 
increase competition. 
2. GAO-12-384, DEFENSE CONTRACTING—Competition for 
Services and Recent Initiatives to Increase Competitive Procurements 
The focus of this GAO report, released in March 2012, was similar to past GAO 
reports. The report analyzed: 
a. How competition rates of services compared to the competition rate of 
products and the trends in competition for services 
b. Finding any new reasons for noncompetitive contracts and task orders for 
services 
c. To see if any other steps were taken by DOD in order to increase 
competition. GAO defines competition rates as dollars that are obligated 
under competitive contracts and task orders as a percentage of all 
obligations 
As displayed in Figure 5, in 2011, DOD obligated $375 billion on contracts and 
more than half were on services, particularly with the non-R&D services (Hutton, 2014).  
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Figure 5.  Competition rates (from GAO, 2012) 
Between the fiscal years of 2007 and 2011, the competition rates for non-research 
and development (R&D) services have been steady around 80 percent and have not 
significantly changed across the DOD (see Figure 6). However, for the Air Force the 
competition rate for non-R&D dropped from 75 percent to 59 percent (Hutton, 2014). 
The Air Force competition advocate was assessing to better understand the anomaly for 
the lower competition rates. 
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Figure 6.  Competition percentage rates (from GAO, 2012) 
Similar to previous GAO reports, the top reasons for what causes the majority of 
DOD noncompetitive obligations for non-R&D services in fiscal year 2011 were due to 
certain contractors being the only responsible source for the procurement. With the 
second top reason being “authorized by statue” and one of the main examples awards 
under the Small Business Administration 8(a) business development program. The other 
factors that reduced competition were identified in previous reports as well such as 
contractors having specific expertise and controlling the data rights, influences from the 
program offices themselves, and unanticipated events such as bid protests. 
DOD has taken actions to increase competition and especially on the “effective 
competition” in where only one offer is received within a competitive contract 
solicitation. DOD has implemented requirements to provide additional response time 
when the solicitation provided less than 30 days for receipt of the proposal. GAO did not 
provide any new recommendations from the previous reports. 
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3. GAO-13-325, Defense Contracting—Actions Needed to Increase 
Competition 
GAO report 13-325 was released on March 28, 2013 and stated that competition 
is the cornerstone of a sound acquisition process and a critical tool for achieving the best 
return on investment for taxpayers. There are significant benefits achieved when 
competition is used to acquire goods and services from the private sector. Competitive 
contracts can help save the DOD, the military, and the taxpayer money, conserve scarce 
resources, improve contractor performance, curb fraud, and promote accountability for 
results. In fiscal year 2012, DOD obligated $359 billion through contracts and task 
orders, of which 57 percent was competed with multiple offers (Courts, 2013). In 
recognizing the need to make more efficient use of scarce resources, DOD’s 2010 Better 
Buying Power and the Better Buying Power 2.0 initiative placed an emphasis on 
maximizing opportunities for competition in the acquisition of products and services. 
(Courts, 2013) 
The goal of the federal statute and acquisition is to promote full and open 
competition but full and open competition is not always feasible. The federal regulations 
have provisions for other than full and open competition. Sometimes the requirement to 
award to a small business prohibits full and open competition. When a contract package 
is created for a contract that is other than a full and open competitive contract, a 
justification and approvals (J&A) document must be created and approved before a 
noncompetitive contract is awarded. The DOD awards billions of dollars annually using 
full and open competition solicitations and only one contractor submits a bid on the 
solicitation. The DOD considers this “ineffective competition” and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) considers this a high risk (Courts, 2013). 
4. GAO-14-395, Defense Contracting—Early Attention in the 
Acquisition Process Needed to Enhance Competition 
The GAO 14-395 report released in May 2014 expanded on the GAO-13-325, 
Defense Contracting— Actions Needed to Increase Competition report. The GAO-14-395 
defense contracting report analyzed the contracting practices and contract awards issued 
by the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The Air Force has 
 25 
made the most significant strides in promoting full and open competition. The Air Force 
has some long standing sole source contracts and noncompetitive foreign military sales 
(FMS) but is increasing competition by reducing the number of new programs that 
prohibit full and open competition. The Army has the highest competition rate (66 
percent) of the four services analyzed (Woods, 2014). The MDA had the lowest 
competition at 29 percent. The MDA’s low competition rate is attributed to a 2.7 billion 
dollar noncompetitive FMS award (Woods, 2014). The Navy’s competition rate decline 
is attributed to the continued investments of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the P-8A 
Poseidon long-range maritime patrol aircraft, and the carrier construction. This data is 
displayed in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  DOD competition rates (from GAO, 2012) 
Although the Better Buying Power initiative began in 2010, nothing ever happens 
quickly in the United States government. As you can tell from the Figure 9 below, the 
competition rate has been on a decline since 2009. In 2012 and 2013, it appears that the 
decline in competitive contracting has leveled off. The competitive contracting report for 
2014 will be a pivotal benchmark for competitive contracting. It will be interesting to see 
if full and open competition begins to rise in 2014. 
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Figure 8.  DOD contract competition rate (from GAO, 2012) 
The data displayed in Figure 9 indicates that $57.6 billion dollars was placed on 
contract and only 39 percent of products were competitively awarded in 2013. The 
decline is attributed to the weapon systems, aircraft, and ships being procured, which had 
only one responsible bidder, lack of government owned technical data packages, and 
foreign military sales customers requesting a specific company be awarded the contract. 
The research and development initiatives have begun to increase competition. The Air 
Force terminated new programs that did not lend themselves to full and open completion. 
Historically, the DOD selects the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for future 
procurement of the systems that would generally include sustainment. The sustainment 
cost is the most expensive phase in the systems lifecycle. One could argue that with 
sustainment being the most expensive phase, it is the area where organizations could 
experience the greatest cost savings from competition. Organizations would have to build 
contracts that allow for competition while ensuring compatibility and integration into 
previously fielded systems. 
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Figure 9.  Competition percentage rate (from GAO, 2012) 
The Government Accountability Office utilized the Federal Procurement Data 
Systems-Next Generation database for the analysis conducted in Figures 5, 6, and 7. This 
team found the database on the internet and requested and received an account. The data 
for Figure 5 was queried in the database and the data was deemed accurate. After 
independently verifying the data in Figure 5, the team agreed that querying the other 




B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORTS 
The 2010 DOD reports provide competition data to access the level of 
competition across the various services. In addition to the level of competition, the data is 
also parsed by the number of bidders for defense contracts. 
1. DOD FY 2010 Competition Report  
As referenced in the competition report from the previous year, the DOD 
Competition Report for FY 2010 identified an important change in reporting methodology 
between the pre-FY 2010 reports to the FY 2010 reports. In the pre-FY 2010 reports, 
orders under multiple award contracts were counted as competitive based on how the 
initial contract award was coded in Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). In the 
2010 competition report fair opportunity was provided at the order level and only 
considered orders to be competed if fair opportunity was given. As evident in Table 2, 
there was a two percent decrease in the overall DOD competition in FY 2010 using the 
new competition report methodology.  Table 1 below reflects the competition as reported 
in the original report.   
 
Table 1.   FY 2010 competition report (from DOD, 2011, p. 3) 
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Table 2.   FY 2010 new competition report (from DOD, 2011, p.4) 
The general assessment by this report was that contracts involving installation, 
depot level maintenance, and/or construction achieved the highest levels of competition. 
Whereas the lower percentages of competition were from those contracts that bought 
major systems, services, specialized equipment, or spares and upgrades that may have 
needed to be purchased from the OEM or supplier.  
Prior to the new competition report incorporating the fair opportunity data, 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) has developed a report that tracked and 
reported on the fair opportunity accomplishments. As displayed in Table 3, the source for 
the FY 2008 and FY 2009 fair opportunity statistics in the table are the PDI/DMDC 
reports utilizing “frozen data” as of January 06, 2010. The FY 2010 fair opportunity 
statistics is from the fair opportunity workflow in the new FPDS Competition Based on 
Obligations Report, as of January 7, 2011. Although the fair opportunity dollars given 
increased from 2009 to 2010, the percentages did not change since the exceptions to fair 
opportunity went up proportionality the same. 
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Table 3.   Fair opportunity trend data (from DOD, 2011, p. 5)  
The DOD fair opportunity achievements for FY 2010 was also broken down by 
various multiple award contract types, such as Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), GWAC, 
and by a multiple award task or delivery order contract awarded by another non-DOD 
activity. Table 4 shows this break down of the different multiple award contracts (MACs) 
and what the fair opportunity percent was in comparison. 
 
Table 4.   Fair opportunity multiple award contract  
(from DOD, 2011, p. 5) 
Although the obligation dollars in the GWAC contracts are not nearly as big as 
some of the other MACs, but the percentage of fair opportunity given is the second 
highest among the other types with 86.8 percent. Additionally, this report went on to say 
that there was an improvement from all of the different MACs from FY 2009 on all of the 
fair opportunity percentage. Figure 10 breaks down the number bids in a competitive 
contracts on from both the DOD and civilian agencies. The zero “0” bids in the civilian 
side may not necessarily accurate since the FPDS did not require civilian agencies to 
indicate the number of offers in the early FY 2010 timeframe. However, other than the 




and civilian side. The FY 2010 figures will serve as the baseline for a new competition 
metric defined as “Effective Competition” in FY 2011. The following data was extracted 
from the FPDS on January 7, 2011.  
 
Figure 10.  Offers on competitive awards (from DOD, 2011, p. 6) 
Table 5 summarizes the non-competitive details in FY 2010. The total dollars not 
competed did increase, but only slightly from $139.9 billion in FY 2009 to $140.4 billion 
in FY 2010.  
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Table 5.   Non-competitive details (from DOD, 2011, p. 7) 
One interesting fact that is presented in this table is that it is consistent with GAO 
reports on the top two reasons under the “Breakout of Various Justification and Approval 
(J&A) Authorities” column why contracts were non-competitively awarded. The number 
one reason being the “Only One Source” referenced in FAR 6.302-1 and the second one 
being “Authorized or Required by Statue” referenced in FAR 6.302-5.  
The findings of competition challenges and barriers as well as initiatives that 
components are exercising to increase competition are very similar to those that were 
described in previous GAO reports. In addition, the recommendation to the Defense 
Acquisition Executive is also very similar, which is to stress the importance of the role of 
the component competition advocate (DOD, 2011). Finally, the competition report stated 
the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) and DMDC partner with the 
component competition advocates to enable transparency and visibility in order to assist 
in any analysis of competition and fair opportunity achievements throughout DOD 
(DOD, 2011). 
The 2011 DOD report helps determine the trend in competitive contracting. This 
data is utilized to determine if the BBP initiatives are making a difference. Is the DOD 
making headway in achieving effective competition and affordability? 
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2. DOD FY 2011 Competition Report  
The Better Buying Power initiative focused on competitive contracting as a 
method to bring down cost and increase overarching equipment and services 
affordability. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
refined the definition of competitive contracting. One of Dr. Carter’s Better Buying 
Power was to create real competition. The definition Dr. Carter provided for effective 
competition is “Market condition that exists when more than one offer is received in 
response to a solicitation issued using competitive procedures for the following contract 
actions:” 
a. Contract and purchase orders 
b. Orders and calls under part 13 Basic Purchase Agreement (BPA)/Basic 
Ordering Agreement (BOA)  
c. Government wide acquisition contracts and IDIQ contracts  
d. BPAs and BPA calls under Federal Supply Schedules, and single award 
IDIQs contracts and resulting delivery/task orders (Carter, 2010) 
Figure 11 indicates there was a two percent (from 56 percent to 58 percent) 
increase from 2010 to 2011 in the DOD contracts awarded to three plus bidders. The 
contracts awarded to two bidders increase three percent from 22 percent to 25 percent and 
the one bidder contracts were reduced from 21 percent to 17 percent. This can be 
attributed to a combination of higher two and three bid contract actions. On the civilian 
contract actions, three bids increased from 55 percent to 58 percent, two bids increased 
from 21 percent to 22 percent, and the one bid remain the same at 18 percent. The 
significance in the comparison between 2010 and 2011 is that the zero bids decreased 
from five percent in 2010 to two percent in 2011. 
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Figure 11.  Competitive award (from DOD, 2012, p. 7) 
Figure 11 provides a comprehensive pictorial of the level of competitiveness in 
the DOD and the civilian agencies. The zero percent in the DOD graph represents the 
contract actions (BOAs, BPAs, FSS, and GWAC) contracts that are not required to report 
the number of competitive offers. 
The fiscal year 2011 DOD competition report is in alignment with the findings in 
the GAO report titled, Defense Contracting—Early Attention in the Acquisition Process 
Needed to Enhance Competition report (Woods, 2014). As reflected in Figure 12, the 
competition rate began to decline in 2009 and began to stabilize in 2012. This can be 
attributed to Mr. Frank Kendall’s Better Buying Power initiatives. The non-competition 
contracts have increased from 2012 through 2007. The non-competitive contract awards 
have been consistent from 2008 through 2011 (DOD, 2012).   
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Figure 12.  DOD competition trend (from DOD, 2012, p. 2) 
The Better Buying Power Memorandum that Dr. Ashton B. Carter issued in 2010 
had unprecedented impacts on the way the defense acquisition workforce awards 
contracts. Prior to 2010, the DOD did not do a good job of tracking overall contracting 
competition. In 2010, DOD began utilizing a new methodology to track competitive 
contracting. They began using the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). The goal of  
 
utilizing FPDS is to more accurately capture competition achievements on multiple 




Table 6.   FY 2011 overall competition report (from DOD, 2012, p. 3) 
The 2010 Better Buying Power initiative also focused on measuring effective 
competition. The DPAP and DMPC collaborated to develop the Ad Hoc FPDS Report 
“Competed with Only One Offer” to accurately capture competition data and determine 
effective obligation competition. The results of this report are displayed in Table 7. 
 37 
 
Table 7.   FY 2011 effective competition report (from DOD, 2012, p. 5) 
Table 8 tracks the dollar amount and percentage given to fair opportunity, 
exceptions to fair opportunity, and total subject to fair opportunity in terms of dollars 
obligated. A one percent increase in fair opportunity given occurred between fiscal year 
2009 and fiscal year 2011. The slow increase in fair opportunity given is somewhat 
expected because it takes years to change a paradigm that has been in place for many 
years. 
Table 9 is data based on another DMDC Ad hoc report that identifies fair 
opportunity achieved by the various MACs. The figure breaks down the funding 
obligated and the percentage on DOD MACS, FSS, GWAC, and non-DOD MACs. 
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Table 8.   Fair opportunity trend data (from DOD, 2012, p. 6) 
 
Table 9.   Fair opportunity by multiple award contract (from DOD, 2012, 
p. 6) 
Five percent of funds not competed were orders with an exception to fair opportunity and 
95 percent were contract actions authorized by justification and approval (J&A). 
Table 10 breaks down the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) cited why 
contracts were awarded on a noncompetitive basis. The total dollars awarded on 
noncompetitive contracts increased from 140.4 billion dollars in 2010 to 156.4 billion 
dollars in 2011. The top three FAR J&A reasons why full and open competition was not 
exercised 73 percent of the time was “Only One Source,” “Authorized or Required by 
Statute” was 12 percent of the time, and “Mobilization, Essential Research and 
Development (R&D)” was five percent of the time. 
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Table 10.   Non-competitive details (from DOD, 2012) 
3. DOD FY 2012 Competition Report  
Although Figure 13 may seem to be a duplicate of Figure 10, the data tells a very 
different story. The purpose of the comparison between the 2011 and 2012 DOD report is 
to highlight the impacts that Better Buying Power 2.0 is having on the defense acquisition 
contracting workforce On Figure 10, the contracts with three or more bids increased from 
58 percent to 61 percent, contracts with two bids remained the same, contracts with one 
bid decreased from 17 percent to 15 percent. A strong case can be made that based on the 
Better Buying Power initiatives that some of the one bid contracts migrated from one bid 
to the three or more bid category. On the civilian side, the percentage for three plus bids 
remained the same at 61 percent, the number of contracts awarded to two bidders 
decreased from 22 percent to 20 percent, and the number of contracts awarded with one 
bidder remained the same at 18 percent. A strong case can also be made that some of the 
contracts with two bidders migrated to the three plus category. 
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Figure 13.  Offers on competitive awards (from DOD, 2013, p. 6) 
The data in Figure 14 confirms that the Better Buying Power goal to increase 
competition is taking hold. Although the overall contracting dollars has decreased from 
2010 to 2012, the percentage for fair opportunity given had a steady increase. In 2010 the 
fair opportunity was 85 percent, in 2011 it increased to 88 percent, and in 2012 the 
contracting dollars were significantly less than 2010 and 2011 yet the fair opportunity 
increased to 88 percent (DOD, 2013). 
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Figure 14.  Fair opportunity trend data (from DOD, 2013, p.7) 
Figures 15 and 16 are a consolidation of the 2010 DOD and civilian number of 
offers on competitive award dollars. As mentioned in the individual pie charts, the DOD 
trend for single bid contracts has declined between 2010 and 2012. The number of 
contracts with two bidders increased from 2010 to 2011 and remained constant between 
2011 and 2012. The number of three plus bids has consistently increased between 2010 
and 2012. On the civilian sector, the number of zero bids has declined; the number of one 
bid contracts has remained constant, the number of two bidder contracts has had 
fluctuation. The number of three plus bidders continues to increase. 
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Figure 15.  2010–2012 DOD number of offers on competitive award dollars, (from 
DOD, 2013) 
 
Figure 16.  2010–2012 civilian number of offers on competitive award dollars, 
(from DOD, 2013) 
C. CONTRACT DATA 
In an attempt to validate the contract and competition data cited in other reports, 
the authors gathered data from existing databases and electronic files from IT contracting 
agencies and product management offices. The contract sample size contained records 
from numerous DOD and non-DOD organizations. 
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1. Data Sample Summary 
Data was gathered from 56 commodity and service contracts. Data was extracted 
from existing databases and electronic files maintained by GSA and an Army Acquisition 
Program. The sampled contracts contained 30 contracts for commodities and 26 contracts 
for services. The contracts were awarded either by the GSA or the Army Contracting 
Command (ACC). The contracts sampled were for requirements generated by 
information technology programs. If the contract was awarded by GSA, the data analyzed 
was the maximum allowable GWAC contract cost for the specific commodity or service 
versus the actual award contract after competition. If the contract was awarded by an 
ACC, the data analyzed was actual quotes from the vendors to determine the highest bid 
versus the actual contract award.  
2. Distribution by Service 
The sampled contracts originated from both DOD and non-DOD organizations. 
The distribution percentage per service and total contract value per service is displayed in 
Figure 17. The purpose of allowing data from multiple sources was to test if the cost 
savings remained constant across services and determine if cost savings was relative to 




Figure 17.  Distribution by service percent and total contract value ($K) 
As seen in Figure 18, 27 percent of the contracts sampled were for overarching 
DOD contracts (such as from the Undersecretary of Defense and TriCare Management 
Activity) whereas 49 percent were Army specific contracts and 20 percent were non-
DOD contracts. The Army contracts only accounted for $8.9M in total contract value 
despite being the greatest percentage of contracts sampled. The total contract value of the 
sampled contracts from the overarching DOD programs was $744.5M.  
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Figure 18.  Dollar distribution by service, DOD and non DOD  
3. Cost Savings from Competition 
It was clear from the data pulled that the Federal Government and specifically the 
DOD achieve a cost savings through competitve contracting. For this specific data set, 
the cost savings averaged more than 20 percent. Table 11 provides the cost and saving 




Service # Contracts Total Cost Total Savings 
Average 
Savings 
Air Force 1 $1,274,938 $673,371 53% 
Army 36 $36,401,509 $8,992,858 34% 
DOD 20 $744,495,571 $126,828,605 21% 
Marines 1 $58,097,368 $4,833,011 8% 
Navy 1 $2,961,838 $676,151 23% 
Non-DOD 15 $86,250,674 $11,908,632 23% 
Table 11.   Cost and average savings by service 
4. Commodity vs Service Comparison 
An analysis of the data sorted by commody and service revealed that the contracts 
for commodities netted a greater cost savings from competition than the services. 
Specifically, as displayed in Figure 19, commodities averaged a 35 percent savings and 
services averaged only a 17 percent cost savings. Moreover, the maximum cost savings 
recorded for a commodity was 100 percent whereas the maximum cost savings for 
services was 67 percent. Of the 30 contracts for commodities, eight contracts yielded a 
cost savings greater than 50 percent. Of the 26 contracts sampled, only one contract 
reflected a cost savings greater than 50 percent.  
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Figure 19.  Average savings by commodity and service 
D. SUMMARY 
The GAO reports analyzed for this paper provided historical data and analyzed 
trends in Federal contracting. GAO 10-833 reported that non-competed actions decreased 
by 16 percent from 2005 to 2009 (Hutton, 2010); however, contracts competed with one 
offer received increased by six percent (Hutton, 2010). During the same timeframe, 
overall competitive contracting increased. While the federal government remains 
concerned about competition with one bidder, it is important to realize that these 
percentages are relative. As the percentage of competitive contracts increases, number of 
contract with one bidder will increase too. That being said, DOD considers competition 
resulting in only one bidder to be ineffective competition.  
The GAO reports proved that the competition rate is fluid when broken into 
categories such as products, research and development services, and non-research and 
development services. The probability of competition increasing or decreasing is not 
consistent across the different categories. It would be interesting to perform a study to 
determine if history reveals trends in competitive contracting in war time versus peace 
time.  
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For the purpose of this paper, the researchers analyzed 56 contracts for agencies 
throughout the government. 80 percent of the samples were from DOD sources and 20 
percent were from non-DOD services. The average cost savings of approximately 20 
percent was consistent with both DOD and non-DOD services. Overall, commodities 





IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is evident from the sample data set retrieved for this project and the data 
reviewed in other studies, the federal government achieves an average of a 20 percent 
cost savings for competed contracts. In the specific data set sampled, commodities 
yielded a greater cost savings than services. We have determined that mandating and 
expecting organizations to average a 20 percent cost savings through competition is a 
reasonable and realistic goal.  
Despite the cost savings achieved through competition, the GAO discovered that 
some DOD organizations reported a decline in the use of competitive contracting. This 
was often a result of a lack of access to proprietary technical data, reliance on technical 
knowledge of incumbent contractors, and insufficient contract lead time. Organizations 
can establish measures and processes to resolve some of these issues thereby allowing 
them to meet competitive contracting mandates. 
To address the lack of access to proprietary data, government agencies can insert 
language into contracts that ensure the government has the rights to proprietary data. 
FAR Subpart 27.4 titled Rights in Data and Copyrights indicates that data rights clauses 
do not specify the type, quantity or quality of data that is to be delivered, but only the 
respective rights of the Government and the contractor regarding the use, disclosure, or 
reproduction of the data. Organizations should work with their contracting agency to 
utilize and reference the FAR and create specific contract language regarding proprietary 
data with the goal of including verbiage that allows the government the greatest access 
possible to data for their program. In instances where programs have been established 
with a reliance on systems and data that is proprietary to the vendor, organizations may 
want to mimic the Air Force’s actions and determine if eliminating a specific program or 
system and initiating a new one would be a viable option and in the best interest of the 
government.  
To help address the reliance on technical knowledge of incumbent contractors, it 
is recommended that government organizations create organizational structures that allow 
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for ample government oversight and transfer of knowledge. If an organization has a 
Subject Matter Expert (SME) function that is only filled by contractor personnel, this 
should be considered a single point of failure. It is recommended that organizations 
realign work and the organizational structures to ensure that government and/or military 
officials maintain an area of expertise in the field of interest. This is especially critical 
when the knowledge held by the contractor is critical to mission success. 
To address the issue of inadequate acquisition planning, organizations need to 
establish a process for allowing ample contract lead time. It is recommended that 
organizations review contract requirements 16–24 months before products or services are 
required. An organization should do their best to develop, implement, and reference items 
that identify both short term and long term contract requirements. For example, an 
integrated master schedule would be useful in identifying recurring requirements. The 
IMS should be a living document that is changing as the organization and requirements 
evolve. Organizations should also leverage existing IDIQ contract vehicles offered by 
other government agencies and the GSA. These vehicles have already been competed 
against qualified vendors and ultimately reduce contract lead time and the overall risk to 
the program. 
Finally, in an environment of shrinking budgets and increased mandates such as 
BBP, it is in the best interest of organizations to do their best to achieve efficiencies. 
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